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The Legible Face of Human Rights in Autobiographically Based Fiction 
 
Meg Jensen 
 
 “For memory to be effective on a collective level, it must reach large numbers of 
people [. . .]it must be accessible.” (LaCapra 1998: 139) 
 
In recent years there has been much debate over what constitutes the divide between 
truth-telling and fiction in autobiographical narratives (Gilmore 2001; Murdock 2003; 
Lazard et al. 2008; Slater 2012; Maftei 2013). Often such debates involve texts that 
portray, or claim to portray, familial and/or state-sponsored abuses of human rights. In 
this essay, I will examine a number of narrative forms, from the traditional restorative 
Bildungsroman, to non-fiction narratives of suffering in so-called “literatures of 
captivity” (Grice and Woods 2012), to the more hybrid and potentially problematic 
form of autobiographically based fictions. I suggest that unlike those forms of life 
narrative that name themselves as legitimate and truth-based (like memoirs, witness 
testimony, or survivor accounts) or as restorative through their status as literature (like 
the Bildungsroman), contemporary narratives of rights violation that draw on both 
autobiographical facts and the creativity of fiction speak to us in unique, and uniquely 
moving, ways. Works such as the novels of Julia Alvarez, Jamaica Kincaid, JG 
Ballard, WG Sebald, Kang Chol-Hwan, Tsitsi Dangarembga and others make 
accessible, and therefore legible, an important frontier: the borderland between 
individual grief and cultural mourning, truth and fiction, past and present.  
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We may take for granted that many of us concerned with the human condition want 
literary texts to enable a movement towards, rather than away from, compassion and 
understanding. We want literature that will “open a discursive space that [. . .] enables 
the exploration of what, exactly, constitutes human rights” (Grice and Woods 2012: 
847). For Joseph Slaughter in Human Rights, Inc., at the cross section of life writing 
and human rights, the key question is how do various literary forms make human 
rights “legible” (2007: 7)?  Slaughter argues that as the Bildungsroman developed 
historically alongside human rights law, both became “technologies for making 
common sense common sensical, for making what is already known effective” (2007: 
7).  Thus the Bildungsroman makes human rights legible in specific and 
circumscribed ways, as it constitutes “a novelistic correlative to the socialising project 
of human rights law” (Slaughter 2007: 41). One of the ways in which the 
Bildungsroman makes rights legible is by drawing upon the real life suffering of its 
authors (Buckley 1970). Nevertheless, the formulaic structure of the Bildungsroman 
demands that despite each writer’s very different real life experiences, the lives of 
their protagonists each follow a similar trajectory. In the traditional Bildungsroman, 
the narrator/protagonist begins “as a rightless individual and moves towards a socially 
restorative resolution in which s/he becomes a rights-bearing citizen incorporated into 
the state” (Slaughter 2007: 41). The authors of these texts have traditionally chosen 
“to reveal and conceal a considerable fund of autobiographical detail” (Buckley 1970: 
94, emphasis added) in their novels. This complex formula of revelation and 
concealment of “real life” suggests a process of coding and encryption inherent in the 
Bildungsroman even as it attempts to make the rights struggles of its narrators legible.   
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Historically, the power to make persons or property “legible” through mapping, 
census taking, and naming was part of a “Politics of Measurement” enabling “a high 
degree of schematic knowledge, control and manipulation” (Scott 1998: 11) over what 
had been made visible. From the Bildungsroman to the misery memoir to the accounts 
of suffering offered by human rights campaign appeals, many forms of life writing 
may equally be said to make rights legible in complex, coded, and possibly 
manipulative ways.  
 
Prosopopeia and pareidolia 
 
For Paul de Man, the trope of autobiography was “prosopopeia,” the rhetorical 
function of which is to posit “a voice or face by means of language” aimed at “the 
giving and taking away of faces, with face and deface, figure, figuration and 
disfiguration” (1979:  926; 930). It gives face to a name, and in so doing, defaces it. 
Autobiography is “always privative” in de Man’s view, as the face it gives through 
language is necessarily partial and schematic. But partial and schematic seeing lies at 
the heart of legibility itself (Scott 1998). Certain forms of knowledge require a 
“narrowing of vision” that “brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an 
otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality” (Scott 1998: 11). The advantage of 
this “tunnel vision” is that it “makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of 
vision more legible” (Scott 1998: 11). This seemingly contradictory observation can 
perhaps best be understood through the analogy of pareidolia: the psychological 
phenomenon in which random stimuli are perceived as significant - such as the 
everyday experience of seeing faces in inanimate objects. 
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In all humankind this face-seeing ability is so finely tuned that we can, with minimum 
information, ascribe not only a face but a mood to such an object (  or ). 
Evolutionary biologists argue over whether this is an advantage, but the phenomenon 
parallels the way in which autobiographically based fictions of rights violations and 
their aftermath might make rights legible. Such hybrid narratives, I posit, open a 
frontier that gives a schematic but entirely recognisable face to human rights and the 
legacies of its violations by wielding “sharp focus” on “limited aspects” of  ”unwieldy 
reality” (Scott 1998: 11).  Readers’ very awareness of the marginality of these hybrid 
texts, their either/or-ness, moreover, makes it pleasurable for them to ascribe 
significance to elements in the narrative that may or may not be random and 
imaginary. Through their unique combination as providers of pleasure to readers and 
challenge to dominant narratives, these texts serve a vital role in the legibility, 
accessibility, and advancement of human rights.  
 
Sentimental education 
 
In 1993 Richard Rorty called for widespread access to a “sentimental education” that 
might “sufficiently acquaint people of different kinds [. . .] so that they are less 
tempted to think of those different from themselves as quasi human” (1993: 122-3). 
Slaughter argues likewise that “the gap between what everyone knows and what 
everyone should know poses human rights as a question of both literacy and 
legislation, as much of matter of literature as law” (2007: 3). Literature might bridge 
this educational gap as a site in which “creative imagination plays an indispensable 
role in achieving progress within the domain of human rights” (Grice and Woods 
2012: 831). Slaughter argues that one literary form, the traditional restorative 
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Bildungsroman, makes rights legible in a very specific and limiting way as “the 
predominant formal literary technology in which social outsiders narrate affirmative 
claims for inclusion in a regime of rights and responsibilities” (2007: 22). The 
products of this technology are neither wholly benign nor clearly drawn: “the person 
that emerges is [. . .] a persona ficta, an often incoherent, self-contradictory, 
improbable figure” (Slaughter 2007: 19-20).  
 
If “literary and cultural forms” “constitute and regulate” society (Slaughter 2007: 4), 
then the normative rights personality imagined by the “mutually enabling fictions” 
(Slaughter 2007: 4) of human rights law and the Bildungsroman also gives rise to “the 
rightless and marginal” who lack “what the incorporated citizen-subject enjoys” 
(Slaughter 2007: 43). Thus the Bildungsroman is “a powerful ally in naturalizing the 
law’s [. . .] ambiguity and ambivalence” (Slaughter 2007: 44). This incoherence is 
likewise found in the often ambiguous functions of author, narrator, and reader in 
non-fictional narratives of human rights violations.  
 
Literatures of captivity 
 
In non-fictional post-trauma and/or post-conflict narratives such as The Aquariums of 
Pyongyong (2001) by former North Korean gulag prisoner Kang Chol-Hwan, the 
reader encounters “life at the limits of humanity” (Grice and Woods 2012: 842). 
While one might predict that the sharing of such horrors would promote a 
compassionate connection in the style of Rorty’s “sentimental education,” much 
recent work on the reception of “true” rights abuse narratives suggests otherwise. One 
aftermath of traumatic experience is that narrative tone of works like The Aquariums 
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“is often oddly measured and virtually devoid of emotion” (Grice and Woods 2012: 
842). After sharing his terrifying experiences, Kang tells the reader simply, “From a 
human rights perspective, my case was shocking” (Chol-Hwan 2001: xxiv).  
 
Kang’s tone is not unusual. In many post-trauma autobiographies, graphic details of 
physical abuse are used to “speak for” the traumatized author/victim, but often in a 
flattened narrative voice that lists atrocities without commenting upon them (Douglas 
2010). Moreover, this recounting of abuse does not tend to evoke lasting empathy in 
readers (Douglas 2010: 150). Whereas the victim/narrators of these accounts might 
hope to elicit compassion or even political action, their readers by and large want 
detachment for themselves and closure for the narrator: “resilient autobiographies” are 
the most commercially successful (Douglas 2010: 150-69).  
 
Grice and Woods claim that non-fiction “narratives of captivity” extend “the 
boundaries of victimhood” (2012: 847), thus making legible the distant suffering of 
others. Nevertheless, these narratives are often “heavily mediated” (Grice and Woods 
2012: 844), whether by the victim’s need to conceal and/or collaborate with rights 
workers and translators, etc. Such mediations “should not - indeed cannot - be 
assumed” to be “either transparent or value-neutral” (Grice and Woods 2012: 844). 
But while Grice and Woods are quick to counter that “these factors” should not 
necessarily blunt “the political dissonance” (2007: 844) of such texts, their status as 
agents of compassion is called into question by a number of recent studies (Douglas 
2010; Seu 2010).  
 
Doing denial 
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In her studies of audience reactions to fundraising appeals by Amnesty International, 
Irene Bruna Seu demonstrates that so-called “compassion fatigue” is the result of 
widespread awareness of external mediations in victims’ narratives in the service of 
fundraising (2010). Seu encountered what she called “a striking mismatch between 
campaigners’ intentions and audiences’ reception of appeals, in that participants 
positioned themselves as critical and discerning consumers rather than moral agents” 
(2010: 444). Because of the perceived “intractable connection between Amnesty 
campaigns and money,” the participants tended to read to the appeals as “openly 
cynical, mechanistic and manipulative” (Seu 2010: 444). As one of the participants 
put it, “We give you the horror story; now give us your money” (Seu 2010: 444-45).  
For a large number of participants, the suffering of the rights abuse victim in these 
appeals was made illegible by the very mechanism that sought to raise aid and 
awareness. Indeed, several stated that such appeals left them feeling that they as 
consumers were “victims in need of protection” (Seu 2010: 449) from the 
manipulations of Amnesty’s marketing material. If the Bildungsroman offers a 
limiting and incoherent view of what constitutes rights, and non-fictional accounts of 
suffering such as rights campaigns and “literatures of captivity” are likewise illegible 
to fatigued and consumerist readerships, is there a narrative space that better enables 
understanding and compassion?  
 
Redescription and mimesis 
 
Paul Ricoeur used the term “redescription” to suggest that although narrative cannot 
directly reference the world outside the text, it can help us see it in a new way (1985). 
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One of the ways in which literature engages in redescription is through literary 
personification (Miller 1990: 5). Slaughter draws an analogy between this literary 
process and a social one he terms “incorporation” “that configures the human person 
with individuality (a name and a face) and sociality (a voice)” (2007: 22). Both 
personification and incorporation are illusions that appear to enable the voiceless to be 
heard and the faceless made visible via a recognizable (though virtual) form, which in 
turn supplies that incorporated fictive figure with both legibility and agency. This is 
where the analogy of pareidolia is helpful. The phenomenon in which a vague 
stimulus is perceived as significant is also a process whereby the unfamiliar (a rock, a 
few lines of ink) appears to be not only familiar (a human face), but also intimate (we 
can read its mood ). This intimacy is of course an illusion. The word itself is 
derived from para, meaning “faulty,” “wrong,” or “instead of” and eidolon, meaning 
“image, form or shape.” At the same time as we perceive this “instead of” face, that 
is, we know it to be “faulty” (we never believe that the rock face is a human face). 
Indeed, it is the knowledge of this illusory quality that endows the reading of the 
image with such powerful pleasure (we cannot help but smile ). 
 
 In pareidolia, what is legible as an emoting face challenges our understanding of how 
empathy and intimate recognition are evoked. Rather than blurring our vision or 
dulling our interest, the simplification of the image and its ironing out of “complex 
and unwieldy reality” makes the emotive face both “more legible” and a “selective 
reality” (Scott 1998: 11). Likewise, the false faces we recognise in 
hybridautobiographical narratives of rights violations are limited and schematic but 
generate familiarity and intimacy nevertheless. In an inversion of the autobiographical 
pact (Lejeune 2001: 21), such texts state that the identity of the narrator may or may 
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not coincide with the name on the front of the text, and that the events therein may or 
may not have occurred.  Rather than the pareideolic effect of this partial vision being 
emotionally distancing, it is precisely their semi-fictive distance that enables the real-
life suffering recounted in their pages to be heard. 
 
Mimesis 
 
The reason that the recognition and empathy evoked in such texts matters is that there 
is a cultural need for the public sharing of traumatic events and their aftermath 
(Huyssen 2003), particularly when those experiences are the result of widespread 
violations of human rights. Grice and Woods refer to this sharing as extending “the 
boundaries of victimhood” (2012: 838) and the spaces in which this sharing occurs 
may be related to Pierre Nora’s formulation of “lieux dé memoire.” Lieux dé memoire 
or realms of memory are visual, oral, and/or textual spaces that generate forms of 
knowledge about the relations between truth, memory, and memorial (Nora, 1996: 14-
19).  Such “lieux- places, sites,” represent the “intent to remember;” moreover, they 
“have no referents in reality; or rather - they are their own referents - pure signs [. . .] 
a circle within which everything counts, everything is symbolic, everything is 
significant” (Nora 1996: 14-19). Like our paraideolic smiley face (), Nora’s circles 
within which everything counts refer not to an event or thing, but rather to ideas about 
the thing, and “beyond simply exercising memory, they interrogate it”(1996: 19). 
Autobiographically based fictions that recount human rights violations and their 
aftermath enable just such interrogations of memory to take place in a space whose 
form is ambiguous yet recognisable.  
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Adorno argued that experience expressed as form “becomes the voice of human 
beings between whom the barriers have fallen” (1993: 54). Huyssen’s reading of 
Spiegelman’s autobiographical graphic novel Maus, builds on this idea of falling 
barriers and on Adorno’s Bilderverbot (Adorno 1944) - the prohibition of graven 
images - which Adorno famously employed to proclaim that “poetry after Auschwitz 
is barbaric” (1967: 34). Using Maus as an example, Huyssen demonstrates that hybrid 
autobiographical texts are uniquely able to respect and interrogate the past by 
employing a range of aesthetic and mimetic techniques aimed at avoiding “authentic” 
representation.  
 
For Huyssen, “it is precisely this multivalence of mimesis . . . that makes the concept 
productive for contemporary debates about memory, trauma, and representation in the 
public realm” (2003: 123). Texts such as Maus, that is, make human rights and rights 
transgressions legible by enacting “a project of mimetically approximating historical 
and personal trauma” in which past and present “are knotted together” (Huyssen 
2003: 127). Nevertheless, Huyssen also notes that there are “dimensions to mimesis 
that lie outside linguistic communication and that are locked in silences, repressions, 
gestures and habits [. . .] a becoming or making similar, a movement toward, never a 
reaching of, a goal . . .” (2003: 127). Thus the incomplete, fragmentary mimetic 
gestures of autobiographically based fictions fight against the tendency towards what 
Huyssen calls the “narcissistic delusions of grandeur” and “imaginary wholeness” 
(2003: 39) implicit in other cultural monuments to suffering from Bildungsromane to 
memoirs to war memorials. Indeed, in such hybrid texts the approximated, incomplete 
“false face” on offer makes legible not only the violent events of the past, but their 
ongoing presence, the aftermath of those events in the here and now.  
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The function of mimesis in a text like Maus is “not to document but to stress the 
unassimilability of traumatic memory” (Huyssen 2003: 127). “Drawing the story [. . .] 
as an animal comic,“ Huyssen notes, “allows Spiegelman to escape from the terror of 
memory [. . .] while mimetically re-enacting it” (2003: 128). Like the rock face or the 
smiley emoticon, this aestheticized, schematic, and “approximating” approach to 
narrating rights violations makes those rights legible in complex and even 
contradictory ways. As Spiegelman himself has made clear: “I didn’t want people to 
get too interested in the drawings. I wanted them to be there, but the story operates 
somewhere else [. . .] between the words and the idea that’s in the pictures” (quoted in 
Brown 1988: 103). Like the “false face” of the emoticon, the mice of Spiegelman’s 
tale are recognisably human and non-human, simultaneously us and not-us, and the 
empathy they evoke is a product of this either-or-ness. It is evoked by the “story” that 
“operates somewhere else”: the story that the reader recognises as both true and too 
terrible to be told. As Speigelman notes, by “not focusing” the reader “too hard on 
these people you’re forced back into your role as reader rather than looker” (Brown 
1998: 103). Through its form, “Maus ‘preserves the legitimacy of the image’ [. . .] in 
the faithful pursuit of its prohibition” (Huyssen 2003: 131). By presenting a simplified 
and “selective reality” (Scott 1998: 11), Spiegelman makes legible aspects of atrocity 
and its ongoing aftermath to a whole new generation of readers (LaCapra 1998: 140). 
 
Agency and authority 
 
The texts of many writers who bear witness to traumatic violations of their rights are 
often inflected by complex and contradictory representations of agency and authority 
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(Henke 1998; Caruth 1995; Caruth 1996; LaCapra 1998; La Capra 2000; Gilmore 
2001). Whereas Huyssen examines evidence of such inflections in the voices and 
faces of Spiegelman’s work, Slaughter (2012: 229) takes note of the challenges to the 
traditional restorative Bildungsoman of a novel that attempts to represent both rights 
violations and their aftermath: Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions (1988). As 
Slaughter notes, this “partially autobiographical Bildungsroman explores 
inconsistencies and contradictions of the colonial systems of Rhodesian society and 
culture” (2007: 228). The novel begins somewhat shockingly; “I was not sorry when 
my brother died,” Dangarembga writes, before turning to a far more traditional 
trajectory: “I shall . . . begin by recalling the facts as I remember them that led up to 
my brother’s death, the events that put me in a position to write this account” (1988: 
1). Here we find the “implicit narrative contract of the first person Bildungsroman, 
which promises to tell the story of how the narrator became a narrator” (Slaughter 
2007: 229). By the conclusion of the novel, the narrator “reneges” on this contract, 
announcing, “Something in my mind began to assert itself, to question things and 
refuse to be brainwashed [. . .] It was a long and painful process for me [. . .] whose 
events stretched over many years and would fill another volume” (Dangarembga 
1988: 204). Slaughter reads the ambiguous conclusion of this novel as “a significant 
ellipsis” whose meaning arises from the way in which it “undoes the seamlessness 
and formal certainty expected” (2012: 230). Like Spiegelman’s mice and the false 
face of pareidolia, this conclusion makes rights violations legible by pointing at other 
ongoing, untold, or untellable stories, at traumatic experiences and their aftermath that 
cannot be contained within the formal certainty and closure of the Bildungsroman, the 
witness statement or the memoir precisely because they continue in real time outside 
the text. Hybrid texts like these challenge us, in Spiegelman’s terms, to be “readers” 
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rather than “lookers,” to read between the lines of the partial and schematic to see the 
bigger picture. 
 
Similar challenges to wholeness, seamlessness and “formal certainty” can be found in 
any number of autobiographically based fictions that interrogate past rights violations 
and their ongoing impact (Jensen 2014). Readers can bring a consumerist, cynical eye 
to narratives of suffering. The pareideolic face of autobiographically based fictions, 
however, creates a space in which rights are made not only legible but moving. It may 
therefore also be a space in which social and political actions are initiated. As a 
frontier between “legal” and “extra-legal,” “witnessing” and “illusion,” “face” and 
“not-face,” such texts adhere to and disrupt narrative authority in equal, and therefore 
contradictory, measure. If autobiography is “always privative” (de Man 1979: 930) 
autobiographically based fictions are also always generative, provoking recognition 
and the imaginative space for empathy, and ultimately, agency, for both the face-
maker and their audience. 
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